Abstract. We discuss several sets of cooperative games in which the Shapley value assigns zero payoffs to all players. Each set spans the kernel of the Shapley value and leads to a different characterization of games with identical Shapley values. The special games we identify deliver intuitive axiomatizations of the Shapley value. We explain how each basis of the kernel of the Shapley value can be augmented to construct a basis of the space of all games.
Introduction
In this chapter, we survey the research studying cooperative games with transferable utility that induce the same Shapley values. The problem of identifying all games that generate a given vector of Shapley values has been first considered by Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) and became known as the "inverse problem" in the literature. Since the Shapley value is a linear operator on the space of games, the inverse problem is equivalent to characterizing its kernel-the space of games in which the Shapley value assigns zero payoffs to all players.
We discuss several sets of games that reflect a clear balance of power among players and coalitions and constitute bases for the kernel of the Shapley value. We show how these games can be used to develop new axiomatizations of the Shapley value.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic definitions related to the Shapley value. In Section 3, we investigate the kernel of the Shapley value. We present three bases for this kernel as well as an intuitive characterization of games in the kernel. These classes of games lead to natural axiomatizations of the Shapley value, which we present in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss how the bases for the kernel of the Shapley value can be Date: February 5, 2018. The second author thanks Aubrey Clark for outstanding research assistance. The other authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from research programs "DynaMITE: Dynamic Matching and Interactions: Theory and Experiments", contract ANR-13-BSHS1-0010, and "Mathématiques de la décision pour l'ingénierie physique et sociale" (MODMAD).
completed to construct bases for the space of all games. Section 6 surveys alternative bases for the kernel of the Shapley value from the literature. Section 7 explores other interesting games that belong to the kernel of the Shapley value. Finally, Section 8 provides proofs of the new results and Section 9 concludes.
The Shapley Value
Fix a set N of n ≥ 2 players. A coalition is any subset of players S ⊆ N . A game v with transferable payoffs, simply called a game henceforth, associates a real number v(S) to any coalition S, which represents the value coalition S can create and share among its members (v(∅) = 0). A solution ψ assigns a payoff ψ i (v) to each player i ∈ N for every game v. The kernel K(ψ) of a solution ψ is the space of games in which ψ assigns 0 payoffs to all players:
Shapley (1953) proposed the following solution φ:
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)! |N |! (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)), ∀i ∈ N.
This solution, now known as the Shapley value, has the following interpretation. If players are ordered randomly (all orderings being equally likely), then φ i (v) represents the expected marginal contribution of player i to the coalition formed by his predecessors. The Shapley value has many elegant properties. For a comprehensive treatment, the reader may consult the monograph edited by Roth (1988) and the textbooks of Moulin (1988) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Here we discuss only some of its properties-most of which Shapley introduced in his original paper-necessary for our analysis. Since these properties have been used in the context of axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value, we refer to them as axioms.
Some preliminary definitions are necessary for stating the classic axioms. Player i is null
Given the assumption that the empty coalition has value 0, we view games as column vectors in the linear (vector) space R 2 N \{∅} , which has dimension 2 n − 1. Likewise, we represent solutions (ψ i (v)) i∈N for specific games v as column vectors in R N . Hence, for any pair of games v and w and real number α, v + αw is the game in which the value of coalition S is given by v(S) + αw(S); similarly, ψ(v) + αψ(w) denotes the vector (ψ i (v) + αψ i (w)) i∈N .
We use the notation 0 for the zero vector in either R 2 N \{∅} or R N (the dimension will be clear from the context).
It is well-known that the Shapley value φ satisfies the following axioms.
Axiom (Null). Solution ψ satisfies the null axiom if ψ i (v) = 0 whenever player i is null in game v.
Axiom (Linearity). Solution ψ satisfies the linearity axiom (or is linear ) if ψ(v + αw) = ψ(v) + αψ(w) for every pair of games v and w and real number α.
Axiom (Symmetry). Solution ψ satisfies the symmetry axiom if ψ i (v) = ψ j (v) whenever players i and j are interchangeable in game v.
Axiom (Inessential). Solution ψ satisfies the inessential axiom if ψ i (v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N in every inessential game v.
In his original paper, Shapley identified a salient basis for the linear space of all gamesunanimity games-which also plays an important role in our analysis. For every non-empty coalition T , the unanimity game u T with ruling coalition T is specified as follows:
Shapley proved that the 2 n −1 games (u T ) T ∈2 N \{∅} are linearly independent and thus (u T ) T ∈2 N \{∅} constitutes a basis for the (2 n − 1)-dimensional space of games R 2 N \{∅} .
The Kernel of the Shapley Value
Given the natural embedding of games and solutions in the corresponding linear spaces, the Shapley value can be expressed as φ(v) = Av, where A is an n × (2 n − 1) matrix that reflects the coefficients from formula (1). For inessential games v, we have Av = φ(v) = (v({i})) i∈N because the Shapley value satisfies the inessential axiom. Since the space of vectors (v({i})) i∈N derived from inessential games v has dimension n, the matrix A must have full row rank equal to n. It follows that, as Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) noted, the set of games in which all players have Shapley value 0-the kernel
In what follows, we construct several sets of games, each spanning a space of dimension 2 n − n − 1, in which all players have Shapley value 0. Since K(φ) has dimension 2 n − n − 1 and contains each set of games, we conclude that every set spans the full space K(φ).
An oligarchy is any coalition that consists of at least two players. The members of an oligarchy are called oligarchs. Let O denote the set of oligarchies, O = {O ⊆ N ||O| ≥ 2}.
We define multiple games for every oligarchy O.
The dog eat dog game w O for oligarchy O is specified by
This game has been introduced by Yokote (2015) and is called the commander game in the follow-up paper of Yokote et al. (2016) .
The scapegoat gamew O for oligarchy O is specified bȳ
This game first appears in the study of Béal et al. (2016) .
In the games constructed above, oligarchs have some power and are instrumental for value creation but the oligarchy is factious and cannot cooperate effectively to realize any value.
In dog eat dog games, a coalition creates value only if it includes a single oligarch-the Axiom (Factious Oligarchy). Solution ψ satisfies the factious oligarchy axiom if there exists a power structure f such that ψ(v) = ψ(v + αw) for every game v, any factious oligarchic game w with power structure f , and all real numbers α.
The intuition for each of the three axioms is that changing the cooperation structure by adding disharmonious oligarchies should not affect the division of payoffs. Note that a solution ψ satisfies the dog eat dog, scapegoat, or factious oligarchy axiom if and only if ψ(v) = ψ(v + w) for every game v and all games w that are linear combinations of dog eat dog, scapegoat, or factious oligarchic games, respectively.
We next introduce a set of games inspired by Hamiache (2001) and Béal et al. (2016) . A synergy function is a game π with the property that π({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . The paper tiger game with synergy π is defined by
The interpretation of this game is that every player i is by nature a solitary "tiger", which can add synergies to any group S that excludes him. However, the synergy of the expanded group S ∪ {i} supersedes the original synergy of S, rendering i a "paper tiger." Since only outsiders add value to coalitions, all synergies "wash out" for the grand coalition, w π (N ) = 0.
The set of paper tiger games constitutes a linear subspace of R 2 N \{∅} that has dimension at most 2 n − n − 1 because each component of any element (w π (S)) S∈2 N \{∅} is a linear function of the 2 n − n − 1 variables (π(S)) S∈O . Béal et al. (2016) remark that for any oligarchy O, the paper tiger game w π derived from the synergy function
is identical to the scapegoat gamew O . Thus, the space of paper tiger games contains the linear space spanned by scapegoat games. Béal et al. argue that the space of scapegoat games has dimension 2 n − n − 1, which implies that the space of paper tiger games has dimension 2 n − n − 1 and coincides with the space spanned by scapegoat games. Hence, every paper tiger game is a linear combination of scapegoat games. The linearity of the Shapley value, along with the fact that φ(w O ) = 0 for all scapegoat gamesw O , implies that φ(w π ) = 0 for every paper tiger game w π . Therefore, the Shapley value satisfies the following axiom, which captures the "paper tiger" metaphor.
Axiom (Paper Tiger). Solution ψ satisfies the paper tiger axiom if ψ(v) = ψ(v + w) for every game v and any paper tiger game w.
Yokote (2015) where g is a function from {2, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , n − 1}. Moreover, their main result imposes the following "continuity" restriction on g:
We show that neither of these restrictions is necessary for the result: the family of factious oligarchic games (w Theorem 1. The set of dog eat dog games constitutes a basis for the linear space K(φ), and the same is true about the set of scapegoat games. More generally, the family of factious oligarchic games with any power structure forms a basis for K(φ). Furthermore, K(φ) is given by the set of paper tiger games.
Section 8 at the end of the chapter provides the proof of Theorem 1. We next present two corollaries that invoke paper tiger games. In light of Theorem 1, we can restate either corollary using a linear combination of each type of oligarchic game in lieu of the paper tiger game. The first corollary follows from the linearity of the Shapley value.
Corollary 1. Games v and w yield identical Shapley values if and only if their difference
v − w is a paper tiger game.
Fix a game v. The Shapley inessential game w of v is defined by w(S) = i∈S φ i (v) for all coalitions S. Since the Shapley value satisfies the inessential axiom, we have that
Then the linearity of the Shapley value implies that φ(v −w) = 0. Thus, as Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) observed, the game v can be decomposed into its Shapley inessential game w and the game v − w, which is an element of K(φ). This conclusion leads to another corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Every game is the sum of its Shapley inessential game and a paper tiger game.
Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value Based on Its Kernel
If a solution ψ is pinned down for inessential games by the inessential axiom, and the addition of games in K(φ) does not affect the solution as implied by any of the dog eat dog, scapegoat, factious oligarchy, or paper tiger axioms, then ψ must coincide with the Shapley value φ. This observation, along with Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, lead to four axiomatizations of the Shapley value.
Theorem 2. A solution is the Shapley value if and only if it satisfies the inessential axiom
and any one of the dog eat dog, scapegoat, factious oligarchy, and paper tiger axioms.
We finally comment on a connection between our paper tiger axiom and an axiom due to Hamiache (2001) . Derive a synergy function π v from a game v as follows:
Let w πv denote the paper tiger game with synergy π, and define the game
where λ is a positive real number. Algebra leads to
Since w πv is a paper tiger game, Theorem 2 implies that the games v and v λ have the same Shapley value for every λ. Hamiache (2001) uses this property, coined associated consistency, to develop a characterization of the Shapley value. In addition to the inessential axiom, his characterization requires a continuity axiom because associated consistency is a weaker version of our paper tiger axiom that applies only to pairs of games (v, λw πv ) for which the synergy function π v has the special relation to v described by formula (2) . 
Bases for the Space of Games
Recall that Shapley (1953) showed that the set of unanimity games (u T ) T ∈2 N \{∅} constitutes a basis for the space of all games. We construct a rich class of new bases for the space of games by expanding the set of oligarchic games from Section 3. Specifically, we allow for "singleton oligarchies" O = {i} and consider the possibility that oligarchies are functional, so parameter k in the specification of the corresponding game w O k can take the value |O| (which is necessary for singleton oligarchies to generate a game different from 0). Therefore, we redefine an oligarchy to be any nonempty coalition O ⊆ N and specify the oligarchic game for oligarchy O with parameter k as in Section 3, 
Hence, the newly added games do not belong to the kernel of the Shapley value. We establish that the family of oligarchic games with any power structure constitutes a basis of the space of games, which generalizes the main result of Yokote and Funaki (2015) as discussed in Section 3. 
For any j ∈ N , since u {j} is an inessential game, we have φ j (u {j} ) = u {j} ({j}) = 1 and 
with the initial condition P (∅, v) = 0. Hart and Mas-Colell showed that the Shapley value can be computed as
Dragan et al. pointed out that the potential function P can be interpreted as a linear endomorphism on the space of games, and hence one can derive a basis for this space by identifying a game w T for every nonempty coalition T with the property that P (T, w T ) = 1 and P (S, w T ) = 0 if S = T . They found that
It can then be checked that the set of games (w T ) 1≤|T |≤n−2 together with the game w N + i∈N w N \{i} forms a basis for the kernel of the Shapley value.
Another basis for the kernel of the Shapley value can be obtained by considering a generalization of the Shapley value. Recall that a solution ψ is efficient if the total payoffs it allocates equal to the value of the grand coalition, i.e., i∈N ψ i (v) = v(N ) for all games v.
The Shapley value is a prominent solution which is linear, anonymous, and efficient. Ruiz et al. (1998) show that any linear, anonymous, and efficient solution takes the form φ b , where 
Since the Shapley value is obtained by setting b k = 1 for all k, the collection of games for the kernel of the Shapley value specified by
where B 0 , B 1 , . . . are the cumbersome Bernoulli numbers.
While conceptually interesting, the approaches discussed in this section provide less immediate game theoretic intuitions for the kernel of the Shapley value.
Other Games in the Kernel of the Shapley Value
For any oligarchy O ∈ O and every nonempty set K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , |O| − 1}, the game w In particular, note that dog eat dog, scapegoat, and fictitious oligarchic games are all special instances of this set of games in which K is a singleton.
One interesting subset of the games w Finally, the conclusion that the space of paper tiger games is identical to K(φ) follows from the finding that K(φ) spans the set of scapegoat games and the arguments provided after the definition of paper tiger games.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first argue that the oligarchic game for oligarchy O with parameter k can be decomposed in the basis of unanimity games as follows:
We need to show that for every coalition T ⊆ N ,
Fix a coalition T , and let T = T ∩ O and t = |T |.
Clearly, if t < k, then w O k (T ) = w O k (T ) = 0 and u S (T ) = u S (T ) = 0 for S ⊆ O such that |S| ≥ k. Hence, for t < k, both sides of equation (4) equal zero.
Suppose now that t ≥ k. We can rewrite the right-hand side term in equation (4) Consequently, the matrix has full rank, which delivers the result.
Conclusion
We introduced several classes of cooperative games in which the Shapley value yields zero payoffs to all players. These games deliver a rich set of bases for the kernel of the Shapley value and lead to multiple characterizations of games with identical Shapley values. Building on these games, we were able to provide new intuitive axiomatizations of the Shapley value.
We explained how each basis of the kernel of the Shapley value can be enlarged to create a basis for the space of all games. Many of the games we presented admit straightforward game theoretic interpretations. However, some of the games require a deeper understanding of the power structure they induce among coalitions. It would be useful to develop more connections between the various bases of the kernel of the Shapley value.
